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Abstract. Quantified propositional intuitionistic logic is obtained from propositional intu-
itionistic logic by adding quantifiers ∀p, ∃p, where the propositional variables range over
upward-closed subsets of the set of worlds in a Kripke structure. If the permitted accessibility
relations are arbitrary partial orders, the resulting logic is known to be recursively isomorphic
to full second-order logic (Kremer, 1997). It is shown that if the Kripke structures are restricted
to trees, the resulting logics are decidable. The result also transfers to modal S4 and some
Go¨del-Dummett logics with quantifiers over propositions.
1. Introduction
Quantified propositional intuitionistic logic is obtained from propositional
intuitionistic logic by adding quantifiers ∀p, ∃p over propositions. In the
context of Kripke semantics, a proposition is a subset of the worlds in a model
structure which is upward closed, i.e., if h ∈ P, then h′ ∈ P for all h′ ≥ h. For
propositional intuitionistic logic H, several classes of model structures are
known to be complete, in particular the class of all partial orders, as well as
the class of trees and some of its subclasses. When quantifiers over propo-
sitions are added, these results no longer hold. Kremer (1997) has shown
that the quantified propositional intuitionistic logic Hpi+ based on the class
of all partial orders is recursively isomorphic to full second-order logic. He
raised the question of whether the logic resulting from restriction to trees
is axiomatizable. The main part of this note establishes that, in fact, it is
decidable.
It should be pointed out right away that the trees we consider here are all
subtrees of the complete tree of height and arity ω. That is, trees of uncount-
able arity, or height more than ω are excluded. This is in accord with Kripke’s
(1965) intuitive interpretation of his possible world semantics for intuition-
istic logic. In this interpretation, Kripke explains, the worlds in a structure
correspond to “points in time (or ‘evidential situations’)” and the accessibility
relation ≤ holds between worlds h, h′ if “as far as we know, at time h, we may
later gain enough information to advance to h′.” If the language is countable,
2then at each point, there are only countably many sentences about which we
could discover new information. So at each point, there are only countably
many possibilities for advancing to a new evidentiary situation, i.e., the tree
of evidentiary situations should have arity ≤ ω. Allowing trees of transfinite
height would correspond, in this interpretation, to allowing a transfinite pro-
cess of gathering of evidence. A “jump” to a new evidentiary situation only
after an infinite amount of time and investigation seems counter to the spirit
of Kripke’s interpretation; hence, trees should be of height at most ω.
The rest of this note is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the
logics considered, and contains several observations regarding the relation-
ship between the classes of formulas valid on various classes of trees. Sec-
tion 3 presents the decidability result for quantified propositional intuitionis-
tic logic. Section 4 outlines how the results transfer to a proof of decidability
of modal S4 with propositional quantification on similar types of Kripke
structures. (Propositionally quantified S4 on general partial orders is also
known to be not axiomatizable.) Intermediate logics based on linear orders
(i.e., 1-ary trees), which correspond to Go¨del-Dummett logics, are also con-
sidered. A concluding section discusses limitations and possible extensions
of the method.
2. Quantified propositional intuitionistic logics
DEFINITION 1. An model structure 〈g,K,≤〉 is given by a set of worlds K,
an initial world g ∈ K, and a partial order ≤ on K, for which g is a least
element. Given a structure, an (intuitionistic) proposition is a subset P⊆K so
that when h ∈ P and h′ ≥ h, then also h′ ∈ P. A valuation φ is a function
mapping the propositional variables to propositions of M. A model M =
〈g,K,≤,φ〉 is a structure together with a valuation. If P is a proposition in
the model M, then M[P/p] is the model which is just like M except that it
assigns the proposition P to p.
DEFINITION 2. If M = 〈g,K,≤,φ〉 is a model, h ∈ K, and A is a formula,
we define what it means for A to be true at h, denoted M,h |= A, by induction
on formulas as follows:
1. M,h |= p if h ∈ φ(p); M,h 2⊥.
2. M,h |= B∧C if M,h |= B and M,h |=C.
3. M,h |= B∨C if M,h |= B or M,h |=C.
4. M,h |= B →C if, for all h′ ≥ h, either M,h′ 6|= B or M,h′ |=C.
5. M,h |= ∀pB, if, for all propositions P, M[P/p],h |= B.
6. M,h |= ∃pB if there is a proposition P so that M[P/p],h |= B.
3The constant ⊥ is always assigned the empty proposition; ¬A abbreviates
A →⊥, hence, M,h |= ¬B iff for all h′ ≥ h, M,h′ 2 B.
DEFINITION 3. Given a model M and a formula A, the proposition defined
by A is the set M(A) = {h : M,h |= A}.
PROPOSITION 4. M(A) is a proposition. In fact we have:
M(p) = φ(p) M(⊥) = /0
M(A∧B) = M(A)∩M(B) M(A∨B) = M(A)∪M(B)
M(∀pA) =
⋂
P M[P/p]A M(∃pA) =
⋃
P M[P/p]A
M(A → B) = {h : for all h′ ≥ h, if h′ ∈M(A) then h′ ∈ M(B)}
Proof. By induction on the complexity of formulas. 2
DEFINITION 5. A model M validates A, M |= A, if M,g |= A. A model
structure S validates A, if every model based on S validates A. A is valid in
a class of model structures C, C |= A, if M |= A for all models M based on
structures in C. A is valid, if M |= A for any model M.
DEFINITION 6. A tree T is a subset of ω∗, the set of words over ω, which is
closed under initial segments. T is partially ordered by the prefix ordering ≤
defined as: x≤ y if y = xz for some z, and totally ordered by the lexicographic
order . The empty word Λ is the least element in both orderings. The set
Tω = ω∗ itself is a tree, the complete infinitary tree. The set Tn = {i : 0 ≤ i <
n}∗ (n ≤ ω) is also a tree (called the complete n-ary tree).
DEFINITION 7. We consider the following classes of model structures on
trees:
T = {〈Λ,T,≤〉 : T is a tree} Tn = {Tn},
Tfin = {〈Λ,T,≤〉 : T is a finite tree}.
These models tructures give rise to the following quantified propositional
logics:
Hpi+ = {A : |= A} Htpi+ = {A : T |= A}
Htnpi+ = {A : Tn |= A} Htfinpi+ = {A : Tfin |= A}.
To each of these quantified propositional logics Lpi+ corresponds a propo-
sitional logic L obtained by restriction to quantifier-free formulas. These all
collapse to H, i.e., H = Ht = Htn = Htfin, for n ≥ 2 (Gabbay, 1981). The
quantified propositional logics, however, do not:
PROPOSITION 8. 1. Hpi+( Htpi+( Htnpi+ and Htpi+( Htfinpi+.
2. Htfinpi+ 6⊆ Htnpi+ and Htnpi+ 6⊆ Htfinpi+.
4Proof. The inclusions Hpi+⊆ Htpi+ ⊆ Htnpi+, and Htpi+ ⊆ Htfinpi+ are
obvious.
To show that the first inclusion is proper, consider:
A = ∀p(¬p∨¬¬p)→∀p∀q((p → q)∨ (q → p))
Then Hpi+ 2 A: The 4-element diamond is a countermodel. On the other
hand, Htpi+ |=A, since any h with h |= ∀p(¬p∨¬¬p) is so that for all h′,h′′≥
h, either h′ ≥ h′′ or h′′ ≥ h′. To see this, suppose h′,h′′ ≥ h but neither h′ ≤ h′′
nor h′′ ≤ h′. Consider the proposition P = {k : k ≥ h′}. Then M[P/p],h′ |= p,
and hence M[P/p],h 2 ¬p. On the other hand, M[P/p],k 2 p for any k ≥ h′′.
Hence, M[P/p],h′′ |=¬p and so M[P/p],h 2¬¬p. In other words, the part of
the model above h is linearly ordered, and so h |= ∀p∀q((p → q)∨ (q → p)).
For the second inclusion, take B = ∀p(p∨¬p). Since ∀p(p∨¬p) is true
at any h which has no successor worlds in a model (a leaf node) and false
otherwise, ¬B will be true iff the model has no leaf node. Since complete
trees don’t have leaf nodes, Htnpi+ |= ¬B but Htpi+ 2 ¬B.1
On the other hand, in a finite tree, every branch has a world with no
successors. If M is a model based on a finite tree, for every world h there
is a world h′ ≥ h such that M,h′ |= ∀p(p∨¬p). Hence, for every world h,
M,h 2 ¬B and consequently M,h |= ¬¬B. Thus,
Htfinpi+ |= ¬¬B, but Htpi+,Htnpi+ 2 ¬¬B;
Htfinpi+ 2 ¬B, but Htnpi+ |= ¬B. 2
3. Decidability results
THEOREM 9 (Kremer, 1997). Hpi+ is recursively isomorphic to full second-
order logic.
THEOREM 10. Each logic from Definition 7, except Hpi+, is decidable.
Proof. We use Rabin’s tree theorem (Rabin, 1969). That theorem says that
SωS, the monadic second-order theory of Tω, is decidable. We reduce validity
of quantified propositional formulas to truth of formulas of SωS.
The language of SωS contains two relation symbols ≤ and , for the
prefix ordering and the lexicographical ordering, respectively, and a constant
Λ for the empty word. Finiteness is definable in SωS: X is finite iff it has a
largest element in the lexicographic ordering . Let x ≤1 y say that y is an
1 This example is due to Tomasz Połacik. Instead of p∨¬p one can use any classical
tautology which is not derivable in intuitionistic logic.
5immediate successor of x. Then we have:
Tree(T ) = Λ ∈ T ∧∀x ∈ T ∀y(y ≤ x → y ∈ T ))
Prop(T ) = ∀x ∈ T ∀y(x ≤ y → y ∈ T ))
Arityn(T ) = ∀x ∈ T ∃=ny(x ≤1 y)) if n < ω
Fin(T ) = ∃x∀y ∈ T y  x)
which say that T is a tree (with root Λ), a proposition, has arity n, and is finite,
respectively.
If A is a formula of quantified propositional logic, define Ax by:
px = x ∈ Xp (B →C)x = ∀y ∈ T (x ≤ y → (By →Cy))
⊥x = ⊥ (∀pB)x = ∀Xp((Xp ⊆ T ∧Prop(Xp))→ Bx)
(B∧C)x = Bx∧Cx (∃pB)x = ∃Xp(Xp ⊆ T ∧Prop(Xp)∧Bx),
(B∨C)x = Bx∨Cx
where y is a new variable not previously used in the translation. Now let
Ψ(A,Htpi+) = ∀T(Tree(T )→ Ax[Λ/x])
Ψ(A,Htnpi+) = ∀T((Tree(T )∧Arityn(T ))→ Ax[Λ/x] (n < ω)
Ψ(A,Htfinpi+) = ∀T((Tree(T )∧Fin(T ))→ Ax[Λ/x])
Ψ(A,Htωpi+) = ∀T(∀z(z ∈ T )→ Ax[Λ/x])
We may assume, without loss of generality, that A is closed (no free propo-
sitional variables).
We have to show that SωS |= Ψ(A,Lpi+) iff Lpi+ |= A. First, let M =
〈Λ,K,≤,φ〉 be an Lpi+-model (obviously, we may assume that Λ is the root).
If M,Λ 2 A, then M(A) 6= K. Define a variable assignment s for second-order
variables by s(T ) = K. Then it is easy to see that M(A) = {x ∈ K : SωS |=
Ax[s]}. Thus, Ψ(A,Lpi+) is false in SωS.
Conversely, if SωS 2 Ψ(A,Lpi+), then there is a counterexample wit-
ness X for the initial universal quantifier ∀T , which is a tree (in the respective
class), Λ ∈ X , and SωS 2 Ax[Λ/x][s] for s(T ) = X . (For the case of L =
Htωpi+, X = Tω.)
We show that for any s with s(T ) = X , the model M = 〈Λ,X ,≤,φ〉 with
φ(p) = s(Xp) is such that M(A) = {x ∈ X : SωS |= Ax[s]}. This is obvious if
A = p, A = B∧C or A = B∨C. Suppose A = B→C. Then x∈M(A) iff for all
y ∈ X with x ≤ y, y /∈ M(B) or y ∈ M(C). By induction hypothesis, y /∈M(B)
iff SωS 2 By[s]; similarly for y ∈ M(C). So x ∈ M(A) iff SωS |= Ax[s]. If
A = ∀pB, then x ∈ M(A) iff for all propositions P in X , x ∈ M[P/p](B). This
is the case, by induction hypothesis, iff for all upward-closed subsets P of X ,
SωS |= Bx[s′] where s′ is like s except s′(Xp) = P; but this is true just in case
SωS |= ∀Xp((Xp ⊆ T ∧Prop(Xp))→Bx). (Similarly for the case of A= ∃pB.)
6Hence, if A is closed and SωS 2 Ψ(A,Lpi+), the structure M = 〈Λ,X ,≤,φ〉 is
a countermodel for A. 2
4. S4 and Go¨del-Dummett logics
Modal logic S4 is closely related to intuitionistic logic, and its Kripke seman-
tics is likewise based on partially ordered structures and trees. In the modal
context, a proposition is any (not necessarily upward-closed) subset of the
set of worlds. Adding quantifiers over propositions to S4, we obtain the logic
S4pi+.
Specifically, the semantics of S4pi+ is like that for Hpi+, except that an
S4-proposition in M is a subset P⊆ K, and valuations φ map variables to S4-
propositions. We have the two modal operators 2 and 3. M,h |= A is then
defined by
1. M,h |= p if h ∈ φ(p); M,h 2⊥.
2. M,h |= B∧C if M,h |= B and M,h |=C.
3. M,h |= B∨C if M,h |= B or M,h |=C.
4. M,h |= B →C if M,h 2 B or M,h |=C.
5. M,h |= 2B if all h′ ≥ h, M,h′ |= B.
6. M,h |= 3B if some h′ ≥ h, M,h′ |= B.
7. h |= ∀pB, if, for all propositions P, M[P/p],h |= B.
8. h |= ∃pB if there is a proposition P so that M[P/p],h |= B.
Depending on the class of Kripke structures considered, we obtain logics
S4pi+, S4tpi+, S4tnpi+, S4tfinpi+ (for the class of partial orders, trees, n-ary
trees, and finite trees, respectively).
The McKinsey-Tarski T -embedding of H into S4 (McKinsey and Tarski,
1948, Theorem 5.1) can be straightforwardly extended to the propositional
quantifiers. For a formula A in the language of Hpi+, define a formula AT of
S4pi+ as follows:
pT = 2p (B →C)T = 2(BT →CT )
⊥T = 2⊥ (∀pB)T = ∀pBT
(B∧C)T = BT ∧CT (∃pB)T = ∃pBT
(B∨C)T = BT ∨CT
PROPOSITION 11. Hpi+ |= A iff S4pi+ |= AT .
7Proof. Let M = 〈g,K,≤,φ〉 be an intuitionistic structure, and suppose
M,h 2 A. Consider the S4-structure M′ = 〈g,K,≤,φ′〉 with φ′(p) = φ(p). By
induction on the complexity of formulas, M′,h 2 AT .
Conversely, if M′ = 〈g,K,≤,φ′〉 is an S4-structure and M′,h 2 AT , then
M′′,h 2 AT , where M′′ = 〈g,K,≤,φ′′〉 with φ′′(p) = M′(2p). 2
Note that the order structure of M and M′ was not changed, so the result
holds also relative to any class of tree structures. We can therefore obtain
separation results like those in Proposition 8 for the propositionally quanti-
fied variants of S4 by considering the images under the T -embedding of the
formulas A, ¬B, and ¬¬B from the proof of Proposition 8.
Fine (1970) and Kremer (1993) showed that S4pi+, like Hpi+ is not ax-
iomatizable. By the same method used above, the decidability of S4pi+ can
be established if one is only interested in trees.
PROPOSITION 12. S4tpi+, S4tnpi+, and S4tfinpi+ are decidable.
Proof. We change the definition of Ax as follows:
px = x ∈ Xp (3B)x = ∃y(x ≤ y∧By)
⊥x = ⊥ (2B)x = ∀y(x ≤ y → By)
(B∧C)x = Bx∧Cx ∀pBx = ∀Xp(Xp ⊆ T → Bx)
(B∨C)x = Bx∨Cx ∃pBx = ∃Xp(Xp ⊆ T ∧Bx)
(B →C)x = Bx →Cx
(where y is new.) The definition of Ψ(A,Lpi+) and the proof that SωS |=
Ψ(A,Lpi+) iff Lpi+ |= A (L one of S4tpi+, S4tnpi+, S4tfinpi+) is the same as
for the intuitionistic case, mutatis mutandis. 2
Other logics which can be treated using the method used above are Go¨del-
Dummett logics. These logics were originally characterized as many-valued
logics over subsets of [0,1]. Here, a valuation is a mapping of propositional
variables to truth values. A valuation v is extended to formulas by:
v(⊥) = 0
v(A∧B) = min(v(A),v(B))
v(A∨B) = max(v(A),v(B))
v(A → B) =
{
1 if v(A)≤ v(B)
v(B) otherwise
In the quantifier-free case, taking any infinite subset of [0,1] as the set of truth
values results in the same set of tautologies, axiomatized by LC = H+(A→
B)∨ (B → A). This is no longer the case if we add propositional quantifiers.
In the many-valued context, these can be introduced by:
v(∃pA) = sup{v[w/p](A) : w ∈V}
v(∀pA) = inf{v[w/p](A) : w ∈V},
8where v[w/p] is the valuation which is like v except that it assigns the value w
to p. The resulting class of tautologies depends on the order structure of
V ⊆ [0,1]. In fact, there are 2ℵ0 different propositionally quantified Go¨del-
Dummett logics.
LC is also characterized as the set of formulas valid on the infinite 1-ary
tree T1. The Go¨del-Dummett logic which corresponds to this characterization
is G↓pi based on the truth-value set V↓ = {0} ∪ {1/n : n ≥ 1}, i.e., G↓pi =
Ht1pi+ (Baaz and Zach, 1998, Proposition 2.8). The intersection of all finite-
valued Go¨del-Dummett logics, however, coincides with G↑pi with truth value
set V↑ = {1} ∪ {1− 1/n : n ≥ 1}. Since G↑pi 6= G↓pi, this shows that the
formulas valid on the infinite 1-ary tree is not identical to the class of for-
mulas valid on all 1-ary trees of finite height. This latter logic was studied
and axiomatized by Baaz et al. (2000).
5. Conclusion
As noted in the introduction, the notion of trees we consider is the only one
which accords with Kripke’s intuitive interpretation of intuitionistic model
structures. It might nevertheless be interesting to consider more general classes
of trees (i.e., partial orders with least element and where h 6≤ h′ and h′ 6≤ h
guarantees that for no g is h,h′ ≤ g), or well-founded trees (every branch is
well-ordered).
The problem of the complexity of the resulting quantified propositional
logics on such structures, however, remains open. It is not known whether
the monadic second-order theory of such partial orders is decidable, in fact,
it most likely is not. If it were, however, the reduction given here would im-
mediately yield the decidability results for the quantified propositional logics
on such structures.
We can also easily obtain further decidability results for logics based on
classes of trees which are definable in the language of SωS. This includes,
e.g., tress of finite arity, trees of finite height, and trees of arity or height ≤ n
for some n.
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